Mrap program manager

Each Husky has a detection array mounted under the vehicle that is deployed during route-clearance operations. If a suspected explosive is detected, the system marks the spot on the ground for follow-up interrogation by either the Husky, Buffalo or RG fitted with an interrogation arm.

Provides vehicles that are designed to safely transport personnel or equipment in areas where mines and IEDs may be deployed due to the capabilities of the armored crew capsule. In addition, the hull of the vehicle is designed utilizing a V-shape, which serves to provide mine blast protection. The RG is the interim solution for the Panther.

In addition, Congress was a key and powerful stakeholder. They were keenly interested in the project and held frequent and in depth meetings with the JPO's MRAP project team; a level of oversight and scrutiny unprecedented for a U. There were many challenges in managing up-line stakeholders, particularly because there were vast differences of opinion regarding how many and what type of MRAPs vehicles were needed, when they were needed, and their desired configuration.

The project team proactively established relationships with these organizations, reasoning that its credibility in managing its agreements and delivering results would be critical to ongoing support from the stakeholders. The processes and techniques employed to manage up-line stakeholders were central to the project team's success strategy and were aggressively employed.

The ten most critical U. The task force held monthly progress meetings that were used to make decisions on streamlining normal acquisition procedures in order to accelerate the schedule of this project. In order to make these task force meetings as productive as possible, the team proactively met with each stakeholder in advance, providing pre-briefings on all agenda topics. It methodically communicated project plans, status, issues and progress to not only the task force, but all stakeholders as well.

Communication tactics included frequent meetings with decision makers and Congress, weekly Joint Program Manager reports, monthly information papers, quarterly Program Management Reviews, and the full range of reports required for large U.

Since the project was regularly making trades in non-essential areas and accepting risks with mitigation, it was very important to ensure that the entire community Congress, vendors, supporters, users, etc. This open flow of information built confidence in the project's management, and also provided a solid foundation for decisions by keeping decision makers aware of the project's plans and progress.

This allowed the team to obtain decisions much more quickly than is typical for major United States government acquisition projects, as all decision makers and their staffs were involved in framing the decisions, and the options had been vetted throughout the project community prior to the formal decision. The MRAP project team was successful in gaining a reputation for honesty and high performance which ultimately ensured the backing and funding to execute the project.

Internal stakeholders included over military and government civilians and over 3, support contractors on the project team, each critical to ensuring the ultimate success of this effort. Managing a joint project from a single service's acquisition arm was very challenging, as formal reporting chains did not cover the full range of this enterprise.

This meant collaboration and consensus, rather than command and control, were often required. To facilitate effective leadership in this environment, the project team focused on building a cohesive team environment, including the use of regular town hall meetings, to ensure both upward and downward communication on all topics.

Vehicle suppliers were another critical group of stakeholders. OEMs had suppliers in virtually every U. The JPO contracted with 6 different OEMs and in many cases the survival of those companies depended on the success of their performance on this project.

These companies frequently chose to perform at risk with no contract in place, to not only develop new capabilities e. This was not a small commitment. Manufacturers took these risks because they determined it was the right thing to do for both their company and warfighters. In addition, the project team worked aggressively to establish trust with all stakeholders by open and honest communication and by honoring all agreements made.

Without this trust and commitment to the mission from these manufacturers, the schedule could not have been met, which would have eroded support from all stakeholders and ultimately cost warfighter lives. Lastly, U. Program growth can be directly attributed to warfighters; the initial requirement for vehicles grew when theater commanders, seeing the success of the vehicles in being survivable and saving lives, would not send their troops out without them.

Informal mechanisms for warfighter input included weekly teleconferences from theater, input from workers preparing vehicles for delivery to theater, leadership visits to theater to collect feedback and informal feedback from combatant commands.

In addition, the JPO regularly received emails from individual warfighters. From project inception, risk was a major priority and decision factor. To document and track the unique MRAP risks, a risk register was created.

This tool evolved from a hastily devised, interim solution for a critical management issue, to a sophisticated, web-based joint service database used across the project to identify, document, track, and report risk and its mitigation.

Risk increased due to the use of multiple vehicle OEMs and government agencies to provide solutions across multiple services. The rapid acquisition and fielding strategy reduced a typically multi-year evolution to only six months from project initiation in October to first fielding in April Expeditious and multi-pronged delivery alone imparted risks to the program that demanded immediate attention — namely impact to the DoD supply chain, uncertain performance, product support, and initial capability limitations.

User-identified urgent needs to address life-threatening risks were documented and prioritized by the MRAP project. The evolving risk register documented the risks mitigated through spiral-development of vehicle improvements and capability insertions, an approach that accepted the risks inherent with evolving a product both during and after fielding but that allowed the project team to further mitigate the risk to life based on the evolving IED threat.

The vehicle and capability evolution approach enabled the project to immediately address risks and opportunities identified by users, such as improved protection from IEDs both to the underbody and sides of the vehicle. These risks were effectively mitigated through leveraging the enterprise resources made available by the joint-service partnership unique to the MRAP project.

The project's approach to risk included mitigation through product improvements; avoidance through capability insertions and vehicle upgrades; and, transference through Firm-Fixed Price and other contracting strategies. Prior to initial production, an industrial base risk was identified relevant to the U. In particular, the current manufacturing capacity and availability of required types of steel, axles, tires, and transparent armor were highlighted as threats to project success.

This rating applied to the vehicle OEMs and their entire supply chain. Effectively, if needed materials, raw or finished, were available, the project team and consequently all suppliers had first right to the material. This enabled the project team to increase manufacturing capacity by advocating for, and in many cases receiving authorization to provide the necessary resources to increase supplier production capacity.

After vehicle production stabilized, risks were further mitigated by enlisting the vehicle OEMs to provide immediate supply support and sustainment after delivery. Risks that could not be mitigated, transferred, or avoided were able to be accepted because of the robust testing and product improvement plans that had been initiated with the vehicle OEMs and government design activities. This plan required each product manager to document and track risk as a major element of the acquisition strategy.

As risks emerged, analysis was conducted to determine the likelihood and consequence of each risk coming to fruition and the most effective means of risk mitigation, avoidance or transfer. Mitigation plans included timelines for resolution and cross-functional impact of acceptance of the residual risks. Each product manager reported the status of high- and medium-level risks each month to the project manager; high priority risks were reported weekly.

Through this strategy, risk was constantly highlighted and remained in the forefront of project execution. Two key elements significantly mitigated risk and reduced the project schedule: 1 the robust risk management process implemented by the MRAP project team and 2 the philosophy that continuous improvement is better than delayed perfection.

These two elements expedited delivery of vehicles and capability insertions by use of the LRIP contract awards which procured large quantities of vehicles in small batches. This created configuration flexibility with the OEMs, and enabled immediate changes to the vehicle to respond to identified risks. The continuous improvement philosophy also led to increased performance by enlisting multi-service DoD activities to rapidly develop and deploy capability insertions and performance upgrades to meet the demands of an ever-changing combat environment.

Insightful and appropriate tailoring of DoD processes enabled vehicle and capability fielding rapid enough to meet combat threats and with enough discipline to avoid imparting undue risk exposure to the user. The key advantage to the team's adaptive approach to risk management was an immediate reduction in loss of life.

Because of the commitment to risk reduction, more than 65 high-level risks were identified since project inception; as of December , only six remained, and all were mitigated to acceptable levels through the MRAP risk management process. To avoid lengthy research and development time, the project team was established to field vehicles designed with commercially available technology. Manufacturers of vehicles and parts extended across most U.

The team accepted the risks inherent in vehicle fielding prior to full testing, based upon the prototype survivability test results. FPII was producing approximately 25 of these vehicles per month. Other vendors had produced armored trucks with some mine resistant qualities, but active production of MRAP vehicles in the world was nowhere near the anticipated requirement of 4, vehicles in a year.

The production challenges included system, component, and materiel limitations. Many of the anticipated designs used common components e. The project team's incremental development and fielding strategy grew from the need to procure vehicles quickly. The pre-MRAP vehicle program production base capacity was bought out immediately upon project initiation as a bridge capability while more manufacturers and more capable vehicles were brought on line.

The second increment consisted of vehicles that could, through testing, demonstrate the ability to meet essential survivability and mission performance requirements. All manufacturers were given production orders, usually up to their production capacity, for these first generation MRAP vehicles if their vehicles passed initial testing.

In order to build a broad and international industrial base, the decision was made to not down select to a single manufacturer. This resulted in production orders to multiple manufacturers, and created incentive for manufacturers to meet test requirements quickly and to expand their production capacity. Some manufacturers were able to meet the vehicle technical requirements but were not able to keep up with production demand; slow manufacturing capability ultimately led to elimination as a vendor.

Performance improvements were added incrementally after completion of the initial objectives to deliver vehicles to theater. The improvement schedule was driven by the ongoing fielding schedule; if improvements could not be designed, tested, and produced in time to support the fielding schedule, they were delayed until the next procurement. Because of the importance of rapid fielding in meeting project scope, the project team did not wait for completion of the full range of sequential testing before fielding vehicles, which would have taken added time and cost lives.

The compromise was to conduct phased testing balanced by small, incremental production awards to multiple manufacturers. The initial phase of testing was designed to ensure that vehicles met core survivability requirements, and had no major automotive issues. Initial production orders were based on the results of these tests and the project office's evaluation of manufacturer production risk. Ordering a relatively small numbers of vehicles reduced risk, as testing continued as these vehicles were produced.

If further testing showed that the vehicles were not survivable and the problems could not be resolved prior to fielding, the vehicles would not be fielded. The subsequent production orders were timed to coincide with completion of subsequent phases of testing. The additional testing provided more assurance of performance less risk , and supported larger procurements.

As a result, the project was able to rapidly ramp up production, initiate fielding within months, and still manage risk. The MRAP team's execution strategy, after initially awarding small sole source contracts for test vehicles, was the use of potentially large IDIQ contracts.

IDIQ contracts had the benefit of allowing flexibility in the number of vehicles ordered, and thus orders could be tailored based on the most current vehicle test results. Of the nine vendors initially providing test vehicles, five were successful in meeting survivability and automotive requirements and were given IDIQ contracts for production.

These six vendors eventually produced seven different models of vehicles that evolved into more than 50 different variants by the time the project was complete. Leveraging the flexibility of IDIQ contracts and the rapid award of production orders to multiple manufacturers, generated the exceptionally quick ramp-up of production lines while minimizing the risk of phased vehicle testing.

The procurement strategy was to remove the risk of manufacturer failure by awarding multiple contracts, and making clear to vendors that there would be multiple, parallel awards to all contractors that met requirements. This strategy was developed to reduce risk to both the project and vendors; the reduction in risk to vendors encouraged the broadest possible capable industry base.

In addition, rather than rejecting vehicles that failed to meet requirements initially, manufacturers were given the opportunity to go through a test-analyze-fix-test process or to propose alternative approaches to correct issues as long as they could do so quickly enough to be competitive for the next award.

As a result, some of the vehicles that initially appeared to be poor performers eventually became mainstays of the MRAP vehicle fleet. This was essentially a competitive prototyping approach, but it was applied, at least initially, to increase the pool of vehicles and broaden the production base. This greatly reduced risk, since problems with one manufacturer could be compensated via orders to or accelerated production from another manufacturer.

Thus, issues with a single manufacturer did not result in major project delays. An added benefit of this approach was that the project team maintained a range of vehicles to choose from throughout the initial project production period. This was an important component to the success of this project because the threat, the environment where the vehicles were being used, and the user's needs changed substantially over the life of the project.

If the project had not had a wide range of vehicle designs available, it would have taken much longer to respond to these changes. Early in the MRAP project, schedule drove every decision and constant change was the rule. While building to an ultimate inventory of 28, vehicles consisting of over 50 variants, the JPO MRAP project team could not rely on many tried and true change management methods due to perceived rigidity and bureaucratic practices inhibiting schedule achievement.

The team, rather than try to control any and all change at its level, accepted the fluid environment and implemented flexible change management processes and decisions. The project team consciously accepted that configuration management and control would have less certainty and planned for this eventuality. Both the participant and landlord will receive notification that the rental payment has been made.

However, participants may wish to contact their landlord for confirmation. Please contact the MRAP organization that processed your application to verify that payment was directed to the correct address or account. Your landlord will be required to repay any rental assistance which cannot be applied to your current lease due to termination of the lease by either party.

MRAP assistance paid on your behalf, or in limited instance paid directly to you is not considered taxable income to the members of the household. No, but landlords are encouraged to complete their portion of the application confirming information provided by the tenant and making certifications not to evict the tenant for lack of rental payment.

When the tenant completes their application and are approved, landlords will be notified to go to the portal and review the rental assistance requested. The W-9 provides correct tax identification number for possible reporting of income to the IRS. It also ensures correct name and address for payment purposes. If the applicant is not related to the landlord or any employee of the landlord, a Certification of Lease form may be submitted only if a written lease agreement is not available.

Future Certification of Lease Form. As a condition of the MRAP, landlords must agree not to evict tenants for thirty days from the last day of the month that MRAP provided rental assistance to cover. Eligibility 1. Who is eligible for the Mountaineer Rental Assistance Program? Who is included as a household member?

Does MRAP provide assistance to homeowners? What income is included when determining household income? What income documentation is required? Do unemployment benefits count as income for this program? What types of assistance are eligible under the MRAP? Will I be reimbursed for any rents, utilities, or other housing expenses I have already paid? Will the rent and utility payments be paid directly to me? Are late fees included in eligible rental expenses? I have been relying on credit cards or borrowing money to pay my rent.

Can I be reimbursed for those payments? Do renters have to apply for rental assistance to receive utility assistance? Is there a maximum dollar amount for MRAP assistance? What types of rental properties are eligible for assistance? Are renters with an ownership interest in their primary residence eligible for assistance?

Will a lease between a landlord and tenant who are related be accepted as a valid rental agreement? Are trailer homes and trailer rental lots eligible? If there is no written lease agreement, is the tenant eligible for assistance? If the landlord will not agree to sign the Certification of Lease form is the tenant eligible for assistance?

Do renters residing in government-funded housing quality for assistance? Are tenants eligible for utility assistance if their landlord pays their utilities? Are renters who receive housing relief assistance through another program eligible for assistance? Are new renters eligible for assistance? Are households with roommates eligible? Application Process What documents do I need to provide in order to apply? Are all applicants guaranteed assistance? How are applications prioritized? Will I be notified if I am deemed ineligible for assistance?

Do I have to tell my landlord that I applied for this program? Can a landlord apply for the MRAP on behalf of their tenant s? What document file formats are accepted for online applications? Can renters who receive assistance through the MRAP be evicted for non-payment of rent?

What should I do if I realize I made a mistake in my application after submission? What actions should be taken after applying for assistance? Will MRAP and its partner organizations request applicant information? After I apply, how long will it take before I receive assistance?

Program Details What type of assistance is available through the Mountaineer Rental Assistance Program for eligible applicants?